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In his 2004 book Organs w/thout Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences,
Slavoj Zizek curtly dismisses Anti-Oedipus (1972) as "arguably Deleuze's
worst book," and instead elevates Logic of Sense (19692 to the status of
Deleuze's pivotal work. 1 At the heart of Logic ofSense, Zizek claims, one
finds a tension between two competing ontologies which are in turn
derived from two competing conceptions of sense: sense as the im-
passive effectof material causes and sense as the principle of the cause
or production of beings. 2 The former would be the logic of materialism,
the latter the logic of idealism. Zizek's argument is that the conceptual
edifice of Deleuze's entire philosophy oscillates between these two
"Iogics" of sense, which are in the end "fundamentally incompatible.,,3
According to Zizek, however, the tension between these two ontologies
is a necessary one, since it points to the fact that any genuine "event"
entails the emergence of something new that cannot simply be derived
from corporeal causes, and which therefore has its own "incorporeal"
effects.4 The problem with Anti-Oedipus, according to Zizek, is that it
largely abandons the (Lacanian) presuppositions that govern Logic of
Sense, and instead offers what Zizek takes to be the simplistic solution of
a materialism of pure becoming. Anti-Oedipus was "the result of escap-
ing the full confrontation of the deadlock via a simplified 'flat' solution,"
and the thrust of Zizek's reading of Deleuze in Organs w/thout Bodies is
"to confront again this deadlock" between the two ontologies (sense as
effect and sense as cause) in order to retrieve the importance of Logic of
Sensefor an understanding of Deleuze's work. 5
Zizek is certainly correct to see a shift in Deleuze's thought between
Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus. The fact that such a shift exists is
confirmed by Deleuze himself. "The surface-depth problem [of Logic of
Sense] no longer concerns me," he remarked in a 1973 interview. "What
interests me now are the relations between a full body, a body without
organs, and flows that migrate.,16 Zizek is also correct to perceive that
this shift-from the surface-depth problem to the problem of the body
without organs-is intimately linked to Deleuze's relation to and re-
reading of Lacan. It is perhaps inevitable that, to a Lacanian like Zizek,
Anti-Oedipus could only be read as a regressive book, as a move away
from Lacan's insights, whereas for Deleuze himself Anti-Oedipus was
obviously a step forward, an exploration of problems that were lett in
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abeyance in Logic ofSense. What the following reflections attempt to lay
out, in a tentative manner, are the internal problematics of Logic of
Sense that led Deleuze to reformulate his own position in Anti-Oedipus.
After laying these out, we will be in position to assess the relevance of
Zizek's rather curt dismissal of Anti-Oedipus.
In the second half of Logic of Sense, Deleuze attempts to analyze
what he calls the dynamic genesis of language, drawing in part on texts
from developmental psychology and psychoanalysis. "What renders
language possible," he writes, "is that which separates sounds from
bodies and organizes them into propositions, freeing them for the
expressive function" (LS, 181). If a speaker before me suddenly relapsed
into violent babbling and began to utter incomprehensible noises, one
could say that the "expressive function" of sound would have been lost,
or at least fundamentally altered. This is the issue addressed by the
dynamic genesis of language: it "concerns the procedure that liberates
sounds and makes them independent of bodies" (LS, 186). Deleuze
distinguishes three different stages in the dynamic genesis, which at the
same time constitute three distinguishable dimensions of language: the
primary order of language, which is the dimension of noise produced in
the depths of the body; the tertiary arrangement of language, which is
found in the propositions of languages and their various functions of
denotation, manifestation, and signification; and finally the secondary
organization of language,which constitutes the surface of sense (and
non-sense). The dimension of sense is the primaryobject of Deleuze's
analyses in the Logic of Sense, since it conditions the movement from
the primary order to the tertiary arrangement of language. I want to
begin by briefly considering each of these three stages.
1. The Primary Order ofLanguage. The dynamic genesis begins in the
dimension of depth, which constitutes what Deleuze calls the primary
order of language. The paradigmatic example here is the newborn infant,
and the clamorous, noisy depth of its body, with its gnashings, fartings,
clappings, crackings, explosions, and cries. This dimension of Noise con-
stitutes a first type of non-sense and a first type of sonorous system. At
this level of the body, "everything is passion and action, everything is
communication of bodies in depth, attack and defense" (LS, 192). Daniel
Stern, one of the great specialists in child development, describes the
world of the infant as a kind of human "weatherscape" made up entirely
of sequences of risings and fallings of intensity-the jolting of a bright
light or a sharp noise, the calming of a voice, or the explosive breakout
of a storm of hunger, with its knot of agony and screams, and then the
passing of the storm when the baby is fed, and the subsequent sense of
pleasure and satisfaction.7 This is what Deleuze calls the "body without
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organs": a situation where the infant experiences no distinction between
itself and the world, but only intensities-in-motion, with "an entire geo-
graphy and geometry of Iiving dimensions" (LS, 188).
2. The Tertiary Arrangement ofLanguage (Denotation, Manifestation,
Signification). The second stage of the dynamic genesis then intervenes:
in the midst of this world of intensities there appears a particular noise, a
transcendent Voice from on high, so to speak-the voices of the child's
parents, or those of other adults. Long before the infant can understand
words and sentences, it grasps language as something that pre-exists
itself, as something always already there: the familial voice that conveys
tradition, or that affects the child as the bearer of a name. As opposed to
the primary order of language (pure noise as the dimension of the body),
the voice participates in what Deleuze calls the tertiary arrangement of
language ("langue," a fully formed language) which is made of up
sentences or propositions.
In the important "Third Series" of Logic of Sense Deleuze identifies
three dimensions of propositions that make up the tertiary arrangement
of language: (1) designation or denotation, which is the relation of a
proposition to an external state of affairs (theory of "reference''); (2)
manifestation, which marks the relation of the proposition to the beliefs
and desires of the person who is speaking; and (3) signification or
demonstration, which is the relation of the proposition to other pro-
positions (the domain of logic, with its relation of implication or demon-
stration between propositions). In other words, in a language, pro-
positions can be related either to the objects to which they refer or to
the subjects who utter them, or to each other. Each of these dimensions
of the proposition identified by Deleuze can be said to be grounded in a
specific Kantian principle: the World, and its states of affairs, is the
principle of reference or denotation; the Subject is the principle of
manifestation; and God, as the locus of abstract predicates, is the prin-
ciple of demonstration. These are the three transcendent Ideas that Kant
identified as the three great terminal points of metaphysics in the
"Transcendental Dialectic" of the Critique of Pure Reason: the Self, the
World, and God. (If God is the principle of demonstration it is because
Kant defines God as the master of the disjunctive syllogism: God is the
ens realissimum, the sum total of all possibility, and the "reality" of each
thing is derived from this originary material through the enactment of
disjunctive [either-or] syllogisms. See LS, 176, 296.) Deleuze is here
following Nietzsche (and others) in suggesting that traditional meta-
physics is derived from (and led into "transcendent illusions" by)
language and its grammar, that is, from the most general structure of
propositions.
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The limitation of much philosophy of language is not only that it has
tended to focus primarily on the relation of denotation or reference, that
is, on the way in which propositions can designate astate of affairs,
which determines the truth value of a proposition. The deeper problem is
that it has tended to focus on propositions in fully formed and already
developed languages-that is, on the tertiary arrangement of language-
without posing the question of their genetic conditions. In biology, for
instance, one does not discover the nature of the organism by simply
examining a fully formed individual, since the individual itself is the result
or effect of a complex set of processes, starting with the genetic code
and passing through aseries of developmental processes. The same is
true of language: one is led astray if one analyzes language in its full
blown, adult state, so to speak, without adopting a genetic point of
view-although ultimately this genetic standpoint is a static standpoint,
and not a developmental one. (As we shall see, Deleuze distinguishes
between the dynamic genesis, which we are here discussing, and the
formal, transcendental, or static genesis of the event). What then is this
genetic element of language?
3. The Secondary Organization of Language (Sense and Nonsense).
This question brings us to the third stage of the dynamic genesis, the
third element of language, which lies "between" the primary order of
language (pure noise) and its tertiary arrangement (in propositions). This
is what Deleuze calls the secondary organization of language, which is
the domain of sense. Why is sense the genetic element of language?
Deleuze is here indebted to the genius of thinkers like Frege and Russell,
who discovered that the condition of truth (or denotation) lies in the
domain of sense: in order for a proposition to be true it must have a
sense. Yet Frege and Russell betrayed this thesis at the moment they
discovered it, Deleuze argues, because they fell into the circularity of the
method of conditioning. One of Deleuze's essential theses in both
Difference and Repetition and Logic ofSense was that, in transcendental
philosophy, the Kantian method of conditioning (which elucidates the
conditions of possible experience) must be replaced by a method of
genesis (which elucidates the conditions of real experience). In Frege
and Russell, sense is defined as the condition of the true, but it is
granted an extension larger than truth in order to account for the
possibility of error. A false or erroneous proposition nonetheless remains
a proposition endowed with sense, whereas a proposition that does not
have a sense can neither be true nor false; it is simply nonsensical. For
instance, the famous opening line of Lewis Carroll's Jabberwocky ('Twas
brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe) is neither
true nor false, but lacks sense. But in this manner, although the sense-
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nonsense relation is deemed to be prior to the truth-falsity relation,
sense only grounds the truth of a proposition by remaining indifferent to
what it grounds; the values of truth and falsity are allowed to continue in
the same state as before, as if they were independent of the condition
assigned to them (truth is still a matter of adequation or reference).
This then is what Deleuze calls "the most general problem of a logic
of sense": "What would be the purpose of rising from the domain of
truth to the domain of sense, if it were only to find between sense and
nonsense a relation analogous to that of the true and the false?" (LS,
68). Deleuze thus alters the formulation of the problem of truth in terms
of the problem of genesis: "Truth and falsity do not concern a simple
designation, rendered possible by a sense which remains indifferent to it.
The relation between a proposition and what it designates must be esta-
blished within sense itse/f. the nature of ideal sense is to point beyond
itself towards the object designated.,t8 Rather than utilizing a method of
conditioning, which would presume truth as a "fact" and then seek its
conditions, Deleuze holds that philosophy must adopt a method of gen-
esis: truth must be seen to be a matter of production within sense
(method of genesis) rather than adequation to astate of affairs (method
of conditioning).
How then does this secondary organization of language (sense and
non-sense) function with regard to the dynamic genesis of language?
According to Deleuze, sense can be said to function simultaneously on
two quite different registers. On the one hand, sense is what has been
called the "expression" of a proposition, something that is irreducible to
the other three dimensions of the proposition. In Frege's famous exam-
pie, "Venus is the morning star" and "Venus is the evening star" are both
true and both refer to the same state of affairs, yet they have different
senses. Similarly, I can attribute the proper name "Sattle of Waterloo" to
a particular state of affairs, even though the battle itself exists nowhere
but in my proposition. What we find in the state of affairs are bodies
mixing with one another-spears stabbing flesh, bullets flying through
the air, cannons firing, bodies being ripped apart-and the battle itself is
simply the effect of the intermixing of these bodies. The battle itself
exists nowhere except in my proposition, which attributes the name
"Sattle of Waterloo" to this particular state of affairs, this particular mix-
ture of bodies. Deleuze is not referring here to a nominalism of uni-
versals, but rather to the singularity of proper names. Put differently, the
Sattle of Waterloo itself does not "exist" per se, but is something that
merely "insists" or "subsists" in my proposition. One ~f the fundamental
theses of Logic ofSense is that sense is to propositions what attributes
like "Waterloo" are to states of affairs: they· subsist or insist at their
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surface, they lie at the surface or borderline between propositions and
states of affairs. Yet this first aspect of sense is only one aspect of
Deleuze's book, and not even the most important one, although it is
perhaps the one most frequently commented on. For, on the other hand,
the second aspect concerns sense as the element of the genesis of
propositions, and no longer simply the effect of propositions. Indeed, the
complex relation between these two aspects of sense is the primary
problem Deleuze tries to address in the book. How then does sense
function as an element of genesis?
An infant is born into what Deleuze calls the primary order of
language: noise, the primary affects (and sounds) of the body, with all
its intensive variations. Simultaneously, in the midst of this primary
order, the infant hears the Voice on High, that is, the voices of those
speaking an already constituted language (Freud himself stressed the
acoustic origins of the superego.) The problem of the dynamic genesis
concerns the means by which the infant moves from the primary order of
the body to the tertiary arrangement of language. Deleuze's claim is that
this movement can be effectuated only by passing through the sec-
ondary organization of sense. It is obvious that for the infant the Voice
on High already has all the dimensions of the "tertiary organization" of
language, which pre-exists the life of the infant: it manifests the emo-
tional variations of the speaker (the voice that loves and reassures,
attacks and scolds, withdraws and keeps silent, complains about being
wounded), it denotes states of affairs in the world, including good
objects (breast) and introjected objects (food); and it signifies some-
thing, namely, all the classes and concepts that structure this domain of
the Voice that pre-exists the infant. Yet the infant itself does not know
what the Voice is denoting, manifesting, or signifying. For the child, the
Voice "has the dimensions of language without having its condition; it
awaits the eventthat will make it a language. It is no longer a noise, but
is not yet language" (LS, 194). In other words, the Voice does not yet
have asense. Whereas the Noise of the depths is an infra-sense, an
under-sense, an Untersinn, the Voice from the heights is apre-sense; it
still awaits the "event" that functions the genetic element of language
itself.
But as Deleuze notes, this is not simply an experience of infants. The
passage from noise to voice is re-lived when the sounds reaching
sleeping people are organized into the voice ready to wake them. More
obviously, we experience it when we encounter someone speaking a
foreign language. The Greeks called non-Greeks "barbarians" (barbaros)
because when they heard foreigners speak, all they heard were
nonsensical syllables ("bar bar"). They heard the Voice, and they could
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see that it "made sense," that it had asense, but they lacked access to
the sense of the foreign language. Similarly, Americans tend to caricature
the sound of French as extremely vowel-y, just as the French tend to
characterize American speech in term of a hot potato in one's mouth,
since most American vowel sounds are diphthongs.
Yet how does one gain access to this domain of sense? For the infant
to accede to the tertiary arrangement of language (the Voice), it must
pass through the secondary organization of language, which is the con-
struction of the surface dimension of sense, entailing a certain period of
apprenticeship on the child's part. From the continuous flow of the Voice
which comes from above, the child will be begin to cut out, to extract,
elements of different orders, to free them up in order to give them a
function that nonetheless remains "pre-linguistic" (LS, 230). This is an
early formulation of the theory of flows that Deleuze will develop in Anti-
Oedipus. the voice is a flow from which elements, which are purely non-
signifying, are extracted and recombined. The first words of the infant
are not formed linguistic units, but merely formative elements: pho-
nemes, morphemes, semantemes.
In Deleuze's analysis, the construction of the surface organization of
sense can be distinguished into at least three moments, which are
defined by three types of series or syntheses (the connective, con-
junctive, and disjunctive synthesis). In the first moment (connection),
the child extracts pure phonemes from the current of the Voice, and
connects them together in what linguists call "a concatenation of
successive entities" (ma ma, da da, bay bee, etc.), which can then enter
into more complex relations, or even an alignment of clusters (LS, 231).
In the second moment (conjunction), there is the construction of esoteric
words out of these phonemes, a formation that is brought about not by a
simple addition of preceding phonemes but rather through the integra-
tion of the phonemes into convergent and continous series ("Your royal
highness" is contracted into "y'reince"). In the third moment (dis-
junction), the child starts making these esoteric words enter into relation
with other divergent and independent series. Yet even here the elements
(singularities) are not yet organized into formed linguistic units that
would be able to denote things, manifest persons, and signify concepts.
Taken together, these three syntheses constitute the production of the
surface of sense out of the Voice. If the first moment of the dynamic
genesis is the movement from Noise to the Voice, the second moment is
the movement from the Voice to Speech. This is the fundamental oper-
ation of the dynamic genesis, at least with regard to language: the
extrication of pure phonemes-which are themselves expressed in
differential relations, such as bat/cat-from the flow of the Voice. "If the
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child comes to a pre-existing language which it cannot understand,"
Deleuze writes, "perhaps conversely, it grasps that which we no longer
know how to grasp in our own language, namely, the phonemic rela-
tions, the differential relations of phonemes" (LS, 230). Deleuze else-
where makes a similar point with regard to the biological domain: "there
are 'things' that only an embryo can do, movements that it alone can
undertake or even withstand"-movements of folding and migration, for
instance, that would tear an adult organism apart (DR, 215). The impli-
cation is the same in both domains: we are led astray in our analyses if
we focus on fully formed individuals (in biology) or fully formed
languages (in linguistics).
What then, within the dynamic genesis, is required in order for one to
move from the primary order of noise to the tertiary arrangement of
language? Deleuze's response is that the genetic condition of language is
what he calls the "pure event," which is nothing other than the
secondary organization of sense itself, or what Deleuze calls "the
transcendental field." The concept of a transcendentaI field was first
proposed by Husserl in his own writings on the status of sense.
"Phenomenology, alone of all philosophies, talks about a transcendental
field," Merleau-Ponty would later write in Phenomenology of Perception.
"The process of making exp/icit ... is put into operation on the 'Iived-
through' world itself, thus revealing, prior to the phenomenal field, the
transcendental field.',g The Logic of Sense has close affinities with the
Phenomenology of Perception, except that Deleuze is attempting to
isolate the field of sense rather than the field of perception. Deleuze,
however, would critique the Husserlian conception of the transcendental
field of sense-which is inscribed with "centers of individuation and
individual systems, monads and points of view, and Selves in the manner
of Leibniz" (LS, 99)-and instead follow Sartre's call for an impersonal
transcendental field. lo Difference and Repetition (1968) and Logic of
Sense (1969) are the primary works in which Deleuze attempts to
explore and define the nature of this transcendental field. "The idea of
singularities ... which are impersonal and pre-individual," he writes in
Logic ofSense, "must now serve as our hypothesis for the determination
of this domain and its genetic power" (LS, 99). Indeed, one could list an
entire open-ended series of empirco-transcendental concepts that De-
leuze develops to define the transcendental field: determinable elements,
differential relations, singularities, convergent and divergent series with
their differing syntheses (connective, conjunctive, disjunctive), the dark
precursor, virtuaIity/actuaIity, differentiation/differendation, multipi icity,
indiscernibility, and so on. In this regard, the Logic of Sense is an ex-
ploration of only one aspect of the transcendental field, albeit an
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important one: "The surface is the transcendental field itself, the locus of
sense and expression" (LS, 125).
The dynamic genesis thus finds its real condition in what Deleuze calls
the static genesis, which resolves what Deleuze considers to be one of
the fundamental problems of the logic of sense: "How can we maintain
both that sense produces even the states of affairs in which it is
embodied, and that it is itself produced by these states of affairs or the
actions and passions of bodies?" (LS, 124). One the one hand, the
question of the dynamic genesis concerns the means by which sense is
produced from the depths of bodies and their states of affairs, Le., sense
is the means through which sounds are separated from bodies and
organized into propositions (the expressive function); on the other hand,
it is only through sense itself that states of affairs are constituted and
attributed to bodies (e.g., the battle of Waterloo). Although Zizek sees
these two conceptions of sense as "fundamentally incompatible,"l1 the
entire goal of the Logic ofSense is to elucidate the exact nature of their
relation and their ultimate compatibility.
Sense is what separates sounds from bodies and organizes them into
propositions, freeing them for the expressive function. "In the surface
organization which we called secondary, physical bodies and sonorous
words are separated and articulated at once by an incorporeal frontier.
This frontier is sense, representing, on one side, the pure 'expressed' of
words, and on the other, the logical attribute of bodies" (LS, 91). The
organization of sense constitutes the transcendental field. In describing
his project, Deleuze writes, "We seek to determine an impersonal and
pre-individual transcendental field, which does not resemble the corres-
ponding empirical fields [already constituted languages, or the tertiary
order of language], but which nevertheless is not confused with an
undifferentiated depth [the primary order of noise].,,12 Sense lies at the
logical genesis of the three dimensions of the proposition (denotation,
manifestation, signification), but also at the ontological dimensions of the
three relata (the denoted, the manifested, the signified). Sense forms a
boundary or frontier between words and things that allows the two to
relate to each other without reducing this relation to one of isomorphism
or representation. Sense is, as it were, the apriori structure that con-
ditions the dynamic genesis.
What then accounts for the shift in Deleuze's thinking between Logic
of Sense and Anti-Oedipus? Why was Deleuze compelled to move from
the surface-depth problem in Logic of Sense to the problem of the body
without organs in Anti-Oedipus? The issue, it seems to me, revolves
around the question of the mode of access we have (or do not have) to
the primary order of language (noise). The implicit presupposition of
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Logic ofSense seems to be that we do not have access to the primary
order, since this is precisely the domain of language that belongs to the
mad.
Nothing makes this clearer than the profound thirteenth series of
Logic of Sense ("Of the Schizophrenie and the Little Girl"), which
compares the uses of language found in Lewis Carroll and Antonin
Artaud respectively, each of whom exemplifies a very different type of
non-sense. The first type of nonsense, found in Lewis Carroll, operates
entirely within the secondary organization of sense. Carroll's technique is
to take the already given formative elements of language (sense) and to
establish new syntheses between them. The work "snark," for instance
(in "The Hunting of the Snark''), is formed through a conjunctive syn-
thesis of "snake" and "shark." Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky" begins with
aseries of such portmanteau words: "'Twas brillig, and the slithey toves
did gyre and gimble in the wabe, all mimsy were the borogroves, and the
mome raths outgrabe." To which Alice responds, "Somehow it seemed to
fill my head with ideas-only I don't exactly know what they are!"13 The
poem seems to make "sense" to Alice because Carroll combines the
elements of language in a way that still retains their sense, even though
they are made to enter into a new synthesis. The term "slithey" is a
synthesis of "slimy" and "Iithe," and thus seems to have asense, even
though it is a nonsensical combination of elements.
But Deleuze also identifies a second, and more profound, type of
nonsense, which is found in the poetry and writings of Antonin Artaud.
Artaud considered Lewis Carroll's poems to be so much "pigshit," since
Carroll was content to remain at the surface, making poems out of a little
combinatorial game (snark = snake + shark). But that kind of nonsense
is nothing-absolutely nothing-compared to the nonsense of the body,
with its pure intensities and noises, which Artaud expressed in his cris-
souffIes ("scream-breaths") "in which all literaI syllabic, and phonetic
values have been replaced by values that are exclusively tonic' (LS,
88)-and which are tied, moreover, to a profound pathology, an extra-
ordinary lived experience. In asense, Artaud follows the reverse path of
the infant (though "regression" is hardly an appropriate concept for this
process): the infant starts in the primary order of the body, and attains
the tertiary arrangement of language by passing through, or construct-
ing, the secondary organization of sense. But Artaud's schizophrenie
pathology took hirn in the opposite direction. The tertiary arrangement of
language (the proposition) is "grounded" in the "secondary organization"
of sense (which is what Carroll plays with); and yet, following what
Deleuze sometimes calls the "bend" in sufficient reason, the dimension of
sense itself threatens to collapse into the ungrounded primary order of
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noise (Artaud).14 This is why Deleuze insists that "we would not give a
single page of Artaud for all of Carroll" (LS, 93).
We are all aware of the fundamental fragility of this domain of sense
and the fact that it can break down at any moment. If I were reading
this paper to you, speaking in propositions, you would comprehend me
because those propositions are sustained by the element of sense. Sense
is the surface, the boundary, the frontier that exists between, on the one
hand, the noises of my body (creaking joints and cracking knuckles,
rumbling stomachs, clearing throats, etc.) and, on the other hand, the
expressive sense that those noises take on in language, such that the
noises coming out of my mouth participate fully in the linguistic world we
all share, this tertiary arrangement of language. As Merleau-Ponty
showed, the same is true for the entirety of my body, which is
"expressive" through and through, having a sense in every one of its
gestures.15
Indeed, does not Artaud's greatness, and his great pathos, lie in the
fact that to same degree he was able to speak and write out of the
depths of the primary order of the body? Nietzsche, for his part, seemed
unable to da so, and lapsed into silence. Yet is Nietzsche's or Artaud's
experience any different from our own? In asense, yes, absolutely yes,
since both Artaud and Nietzsche suffered a profound pathology most of
us will never have to confront. But in another sense, no, things are not
so different, since stumbling over a single ward (parapraxes)would be
enough to reveal the fragility of the sense that sustains what I am
saying, the chaos that constantly threatens to bubble up and subsurne
everything, making us fall into "the undifferentiated abyss of a
groundlessness which only permits the pulsation of a monstrous body"
(LS, 120).
A revealing passage in Logic of Sense reveals Deleuze's hesitations
about remaining at the surface, while remaining fully aware of the
dangers of plunging into the depths-the depths into which Nietzsche
himself "perished in his own manner" (LS, 108). Deleuze muses aloud
about the situation of a philosopher like himself, writing on Artaud's
schizophrenia, Nietzsche's collapse, Hölderlin's madness, Woolf's suicide,
Fitzgerald's breakdown, Lowry's alcoholism, Bousquet's wound-all the
while remaining on the surface, dipping his toes in the water, but not
diving into the depths himself.
All these questions point to the ridiculousness of the thinker.... Are
we to speak always about Bousquet's waund, about Fitzgerald and
Lowry's alcoholism, Nietzsche and Artaud's madness while re-
maining on the shore? Are we to become the professionals who
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give talks on these topics? Are we to take up collections and
create special journal issues? Or should we go a short way further
to see for ourselves, to be a little alcoholic, a little mad, a little
suicidal, a little of guerilla-just enough to extend the crack, but
not enough to deepen it irremediably? Wherever we turn, every-
thing seems dismal. Indeed, how are we to stay at the surface
without staying on the shore? (LS 157-8).
In Anti-Oedipus, one might say, Deleuze took the plunge and dove
into the depths. This is what separates Anti-Oedipus from the Logic of
Sense. Anti-Oedipus explicitly takes the most extreme form of psychosis
-schizophrenia-as its model for the unconscious, and it unhesitatingly
attempts to write about the "depths" in a straightforward manner. In
this, Deleuze seemed to have taken a cue from Lacan, who had insisted
that the unconscious, or the Real, is revealed in its purest and least
mediated form in psychosis, rather than in neurosis or perversion
(neurosis, perversion, and psychosis being the three main categories in
Lacan's diagnostic schema). Deleuze seems to have seen both Logic of
Sense and Masochism: Co/dness and Crue/ty as somewhat timid books,
approaching the question of the unconscious through still safe models
drawn from perversion-the pervert having achieved a "mastery of
surfaces."16 Lacan himself, however, never used psychosis directly as a
model for the unconscious. Psychotics resist entry into the Symbolic
(foreclosure) because they mistake words for things; and they resist
therapeutization because they have a libido that is too liquid or viscous.
The dimension of the Real can at best only appear as a "gap" or
"rupture" in the Symbolic. But rather than seeing foreclosure as a
resistance of the ego, Deleuze sees it as the intensive outcry of what he
calls "desiring-production" (AO, 67). Indeed, Deleuze's term for the Real
is "schizophrenia as a pure process" (which must be distinguished from
the schizophrenic as a clinical entity), and it is with this concept that
Deleuze can be seen to have taken Lacan's thought to its limit and
conclusion. "It is this entire reverse side of the [symbolic] structure that
Lacan discovers ... schizophrenizing the analytic field, instead of oedi-
palizing the psychotic field" (AO, 309).
Hence, following directions hinted at by Lacan himself, Anti-Oedipus
attempts to use the model of schizophrenia to describe the Real in all its
positivity: differential partial objects or intensities that enter into indirect
syntheses; pure positive multiplicities where everything is possible
(transverse connections, polyvocal conjunctions, included disjunctions);
signs of desire that compose a signifying chain, but which are them-
selves non-signifying, and so on (AO, 309). The domain of the Real is a
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"sub-representative field," but Deleuze does not hesitate to claim that
"we have the means to penetrate the sub-representational"17 Some of
Deleuze's most insightful texts on schizophrenics-such as "Louis Wolf-
son; or, The Procedure"-are those that analyze the specifically schizo-
phrenic uses of language, which push language to its limit and undo its
significations and designations.18 Deleuze suggests that the usual
negative diagnostic criteria that have been proposed for schizophrenia-
dissociation, detachment from reality, autism-are above all useful terms
for not listening to schizophrenics. But in the end, this problem is not
specific to schizophrenics: "we are alllibidos that are too viscous and too
fluid ..." (AG, 67; see 312).
Whereas Logic of Sense was content to remain at the surface of
sense (Lewis Carroll), Anti-Oedipus can be said to have plunged into the
depth of bodies (Artaud). Why, then, does Deleuze no longer speak of
the "depths" in Anti-Oedipus? At the very least, the concept of depth has
relevance only from the viewpoint of a theory of surfaces; outside of that
context, the notion of depth loses its relevance. Once Deleuze ensconces
himself in the depths, so to speak, he requires a new conceptual appara-
tus. This is why in Anti-Oedipus the surface-depth problem of Logic of
Sense is replaced with the problem of the body without organs, and the
flows that traverse it. The concept of the "body without organs," which
Deleuze derives from Artaud, had already appeared in Logic of Sense,
but only as a means of describing the largely undifferentiated status of
the depths of bodies-"an organism without parts which operates
entirely by insufflation, respiration, evaporation, and fluid transmission"
(LS, 88). In the depth of bodies, the possible uses of language are
altered accordingly: "In this primary order of schizophrenia, the only
duality is that between the actions and passions of bodies.... Here
everything happens, acts, and is acted upon beneath sense and far from
the surface-sub-sense, a-sense, Untersinn. ... The word becomes the
action of a body without parts, instead of being the passion of a frag-
mented organism.... There is no longer anything to prevent propositions
from falling back onto bodies and from mingling their sonorous elements
with the body's olfactory, gustatory, or digestive affects" (LS, 89-91). In
the Logic ofSense, in other words, the transcendental field is the surface
of sense itself, and the depths of bodies are a largely undifferentiated
abyss into which one falls once the surface gives way. Although Artaud
may have managed to give us a glimpse into the depths, he is the great
exception: "Artaud is alone in having been an absolute depth in lit-
erature, and in having discovered a vital body and the prodigious
language of this body. As he says, he discovered them through suffering.
He explored the infra-sense, which is still unknown today."19
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Anti-Oedipus attempts to explore the nature of this still unknown
dimension of infra-sense; the transcendental field is pushed into the
depths. If Deleuze abandons the surface-depth terminology it is no doubt
because the nation of depth carries a somewhat negative connatation, as
an undifferentiated groundlessness in relation to the constituted surface
dimension of sense. Anti-Oedipus instead focuses on the specific element
of depth that Artaud had discovered and named: the body without
organs. In Anti-Oedipus, however, the body without organs is no langer
linked with the depths, but rather is constituted by and constitutes its
own transcendental field, which Deleuze characterizes in terms of the
logic of the passive syntheses. Summarizing briefly, one could say that
Deleuze assigns three fundamental components to the concept of the
body without organs:
1. Organs-parts. Schizophrenics experience their organs in a non-
organic manner, that is, as elements or singularities that are connected
to other elements in the complex functioning of a "machinic assemblage"
(connective synthesis). In The Empty Fortress, for example, Bruno Bet-
telheim presents a portrait of little Joey, a kind of "child-machine" who
could live, eat, defecate, breathe, and sleep only by plugging himself into
motors, carburetors, steering wheels, lamps, and real or imaginary cir-
cuits. "He had to establish these imaginary electric circuits [raccorde-
ments] before he could eat, for only the current could make his digestive
tract work. He executed this ritual with such dexterity that we had to
double check to make sure he had neither cord nor socket."20
2. The Body Without Organs. But the breakdowns in the functioning
of these organ-machines reveals a second theme: that of the body with-
out organs as such, a non-productive surface upon which the an-organic
functioning of the organs is stopped dead in a kind of catatonic stupor
(disjunctive synthesis). In this sense, the body without organs is a model
of death (the death instinct), albeit a death that is coextensive with life.
Authors of horror stories, like Edgar Allen Poe, know this weil, when they
appeal to the terror, not of the organic corpse, but of the catatonic
schizophrenic; the organism remains intact, with its vacant gaze and
rigid postures, but the vital intensity of the body has been suspended,
frozen, blocked.
3. Intensities. These two poles-the vital an-organic functioning of
the organs and their frozen catatonic stasis, with all the variations of
attraction and repulsion that exist between them---can be said to trans-
late the entire anguish of the schizophrenic. These two poles are never
separate from each other but generate between them various forms in
which sometimes repulsion and sometimes attraction dominates: the
paranoid form of schizophrenia (repulsion) and its miraculating or fan-
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tastic form (attraction). This is the third theme of schizophrenia: the
theme of intensive variation (conjunctive synthesis). Schizophrenics tend
to experience these oscillating intensities (manie rises in intensity,
depressive falls in intensity) in an almost pure state. Beneath the hal-
lucinations of the senses ("I see," "I hear") and the deliriums of thought
("I think"), there is samething more profound, a feeling of intensity, that
is, a becoming or a transition ("I feei"). A gradient is crossed, a threshold
is surpassed or retreated from, amigration is brought about: "I feel that
I am becoming woman," "I feel that I am becoming god," "I feel that I
am becoming pure matter."
The innovation of Anti-Oedipus, beyond Logic of Sense, is to have
penetrated into this sub-representative, schizophrenie domain of the
body without organs and made use of it as the model for the
unconscious itself. The analysis of this unconscious will entail a corres-
ponding practice that Deleuze and Guattari will call "schizoanalysis." In
developing his model of the body without organs, Deleuze admitted his
debt to the work of Pierre Klossowski, notably the latter's Nietzsehe and
the Vicious Circ/e. Klossowski showed how we get a glimpse into
Nietzsche's delirium in the letters and postcards he wrote before his
collapse. In them, language took on a purely intensive use, insofar as it
directly expressed the "primary order" of Nietzsche's body and its im-
pulsive states. In Nietzsche's last writings, each of these states received
its own proper name-some of which designated Nietzsche's "attractive"
allies, or manie rises in intensity (Prado, Lesseps, Chambige, "honest
criminals," Dionysus), while others designated his "repulsive" enemies, or
depressive falls in intensity (Caiaphus, William, Bismark, the "anti-
semites," the Crucified)-a chaos of pure oscillations ultimately invested
by "all the names of history.,,21 Yet was it not this very experience that
Nietzsehe confronted throughout all his writings, lang before his
breakdown?22 In any case, in Anti-Oedipus, Artaud no langer appears as
the exception, the one who was able to speak from the "depths," and
Deleuze is able to appeal to a lang list of writers and thinkers who, as
Klossowski shows, pushed the use of language to its intensive limits.
With this reading of Deleuze's own movement from Logic ofSense to
Anti-Oedipus in hand, it should perhaps be clear why a Lacanian like
Zizek would almost inevitably have to characterize Anti-Oedipus as
Deleuze's warst book, and as a betrayal of Lacan. The issue revolves
around the status of what Laean ealled the Real. For an "orthodox"
Lacanian, the Real is the name for a "gap" in the Symbolie, a moment of
radical negativity that can never be approached in itself, but can only be
discerned in its effects. Although Lacan himself insisted that psychosis
provides the most direct access to the unconscious, the access psycho-
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tics have to the symbolic is necessarily "foreclosed." It is this orthodox
interpretation of the Real that Deleuze and Guattari contest in Anti-
Oedipus. The Real is indeed the internal limit to any process of
symbolization, but Deleuze insists that Lacan was never content to
describe the Real, negatively, as a resistant kernel within the symbolic
process upon whose internalized exclusion the symbolic is constituted
(negation or exclusion as constitutive). Rather, Lacan was pushing
psychoanalysis to "the point of its self critique," where the Real would be
able to appear in all its positivity: "the point where the structure, beyond
the images that fill it [fantasies] and the Symbolic that conditions it
within representation, reveals its reverse side as a positive principle of
nonconsistency that dissolves it.,,23 What Lacan discovered (and what
psychosis makes manifest most directly) is the reverse side of the
symbolic structure, and Deleuze can say that he was simply following
directions indicated by Lacan himself when, in Anti-Oedipus, he and
Guattari attempted to describe the Real in all its positivity: differential
partial objects or intensities that enter into indirect syntheses; pure
positive multiplicities where everything is possible (transverse connec-
tions, polyvocal conjunctions, included disjunctions); signs of desire that
compose a signifying chain, but which are themselves non-signifying,
and so on. The fundamental question no longer concerns the means by
which a transcendent "gap" is constituted within the Symbolic, but the
immanent means by which the Real is betrayed and converted into a
symbolizing structure. Put simply, one could say that psychoanalysis
begins with the symbolic and seeks out the gaps that mark the irruption
of an "impossible" Real, whereas schizoanalysis starts with the Real as
the immanent process of desire, and seeks to mark both the mechanisms
by which the process is interrupted (reterritorializations) and the
conditions under which it can be continued and transformed (becomings,
intensities). It is perhaps in this sense that, as Deleuze hirnself said in
the Abecedaire interviews of 1998-1999, Anti-Oedipus is "a book still to
be discovered," above all by readers of Lacan.24
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